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Reflections on building more inclusive global governance

Ten insights into emerging practice

A synthesis of participants' observations and recommendations from the 2020 Chatham House 'Inclusive Governance Initiative' series of roundtables



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01

Introduction

The Inclusive Governance Initiative, launched in 2020 as Chatham House marked its centenary, is exploring how global governance can be reshaped to meet the challenges of today's world. The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the urgent need for change in the structures and mechanisms of international cooperation. Greater inclusiveness must be a central ingredient, and must go beyond symbolism: the meaningful inclusion of a wider range of non-state actors and the more equitable participation of states are essential for progress on complex, interconnected global issues. The transformation of multilateral bodies and international governance structures into effective agents of change for today's world is long overdue.

The architecture and functioning of international governance have threaded throughout the institute's work since its earliest years. Drawing on that foundation, along with diverse expertise across Chatham House's research programmes, the Inclusive Governance Initiative aims to identify practical pathways for embedding inclusivity into global governance arrangements. While inclusivity alone will not address the complex issues around effectiveness and legitimacy in current global governance – and raises many challenges in its execution – it is a necessary ingredient for the development of governance arrangements that can both command broad support and deliver solutions in today's environment.

During 2020, Chatham House hosted a series of roundtables with actors on the front lines of global governance who have been – or are currently in the midst of – tackling questions of participation in their specialized domains. The aim of the roundtables was to step back from daily policy discussions and reflect on process: what works well, what does not, and *how* we can build global governance mechanisms that are more representative, collaborative and effective.

Participants considered the challenges to global governance through a wide lens: in each case not only the role of international organizations, but also the range of mechanisms and processes outside official structures that contribute to international cooperation and the evolution of the goals, norms, rules and standard practices of good governance. As agency and power have dispersed in recent years, an ever-wider range of governance approaches has emerged. How these fit within the existing global governance ecosystem, and whether they can address criticisms around the legitimacy and efficacy of current practice, remain open questions.

The roundtables focused on three areas where arrangements are currently in evolution: digital governance, environmental governance and economic governance.¹ Our conversations gathered perspectives from Africa, the Americas, East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia, as well as from a diverse range of sectors including international and regional organizations, international coalitions, national and local governments, the private sector, trade associations, civil society organizations (CSOs), philanthropic organizations, grassroots movements, technical communities and academia. To encourage frank exchange, the roundtables were conducted under the Chatham House Rule.²

The roundtables provided a wealth of observations on areas of progress as well as deficit in global governance. They identified opportunities for advancing inclusion and obstacles that need to be overcome. This synthesis paper highlights 10 cross-cutting insights that came out of the roundtables, both on the state of governance and on emerging practice. The aim is to assist public policy actors in crafting more inclusive approaches to global challenges, and in delivering more sustainable and legitimate solutions for communities. The recommendations are not intended to be comprehensive. Our consultations covered a limited span of governance issues, and this is a rapidly evolving arena. Rather, the aim of this paper is to share views from governance areas in which the push towards greater inclusivity is under way, in order to spur thinking in these and other global domains.³

¹ More specifically, these roundtables explored developments in internet and cyber governance; climate, air pollution and ocean policies; and various strands of international investment governance, including investor–state dispute resolution, the patchwork of governance around international investment agreements, and the implications of supply chain practices.

² When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

³ The insights shared in this paper reflect views raised at the roundtables and in supplementary interviews with additional experts. They are not intended to reflect any consensus reached during the discussions among participants. Nor should they be construed as reflecting any institutional position on the part of Chatham House.

02 Roundtable perspectives: understanding the context

The multilateral system is outdated. A refit is long overdue.

Multilateralism is facing a crisis of confidence. The system designed in the 20th century has successfully curbed great-power conflict and advanced humanitarian and development aims. But it has significant deficits in terms of legitimacy, transparency, accountability and equitable representation. The benefits of global cooperation, notably in the economic domain, have been far from equitably distributed. For many citizens, there is a deeply embedded distrust of (i) the intentions driving collective decisions, (ii) the credibility of public commitments and (iii) the efficacy of multilateral spending. Imbalances that were built into the design of today's multilateral system continue to frustrate marginalized states. More fundamentally, global governance appears as a distant diplomatic exercise, serving states and global elites, but disconnected from the needs and priorities of its most numerous constituents: citizens and communities. One roundtable participant noted that the system may be working effectively at the 'thin', interest-based level [among states], but that the deeper values of multilateralism are under threat.

At the same time, our consultations indicated that the global governance system as it stands is increasingly mismatched with many of the change-makers of today's world. Participants in the roundtables reflected on how agency has dispersed as citizens have gained increased access to information, technology and the means

for mobilization. Civil society and grassroots initiatives in some countries and regions hold more power than ever before, and in many parts of the world business actors are leading social and environmental change. Scientific and technological development is increasingly driven by the private sector, requiring governments to engage with privately owned companies in order to pursue national security and economic interests.

The unwieldy structures of international organizations are having difficulty keeping pace with the fluidity and speed of global challenges. There are also pressures around demographic change, with growing young populations the most disconnected from economic opportunity, and around the rise of South–South networks and geo-economic shifts more generally. A refit of global governance for today’s world is long overdue, as UN Secretary-General António Guterres frequently states.

But even if confidence in multilateral institutions is under pressure both from publics and governments, the roundtable discussions underscored that collective action remains a necessity. Despite a fractious political environment, world leaders echoed this point in the September 2020 declaration commemorating the 75th anniversary of the United Nations.⁴ There is an ever-growing list of issues too large for individual or even partial groups of states to address.

The ticking climate clock, the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were just a few of the issues highlighted. A rules-based international system remains fundamental to managing the global commons, and to striking a fair balance between responsibilities and interests. Emerging frontiers for public policy – over artificial intelligence (AI), biogenetics and outer space, for example – are presenting new questions to current governance structures. Even when geopolitical competition risks freezing multilateral action, it is imperative to find alternatives; long-term global projects are not built for cyclical stops and starts.

Why inclusivity deserves attention

Greater inclusion is an important element of re-engineering global governance for today’s world. The influence of new agents of change is showing that states do not control the governance equation as they once did.

Bottom-up civic movements have become more powerful change-makers, even in some closed societies, and technology is enabling their influence to spread. Meanwhile, emerging markets are demanding a greater role in shaping global governance. Where this is not happening, they are moving on their own tracks to create regional, plurilateral or other governance policies. Leaving these actors aside risks neglecting key elements of both the problem and the potential solution. The formula of global rule-makers and rule-takers that anchored the international system in recent decades has become obsolete. Demographic trends and urbanization will only further cement this reality.

⁴ Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly, 21 September 2020.

The movement towards corporate social responsibility and responsible investing using environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics has created an entirely new category of leverage over global policy issues. Consumers and shareholders are driving economic pressure for companies to adopt more sustainable products and practices. Whatever the motivation, these market forces have taken on a momentum that in some areas is driving normative change even where governments are hesitant, especially in respect of environmental issues.

Time and again in our roundtables, participants emphasized that building greater inclusivity into global governance will require a shift in both practice and mindset.

This trend reflects just one channel of influence, and is by no means a substitute for the mandates of governments, but a number of roundtable participants noted that such leverage can be a useful driver of progress – one that is especially powerful once capital flows move behind it. As one participant argued, carbon border adjustment mechanisms may become the largest single driver of international investment governance in the decade ahead. And with technology innovation taking place outside state frameworks, the inclusion of technology actors in shaping global regulatory initiatives has become imperative.

Constituency outreach is not new for public officials, nor are campaigns for outside parties to lobby the direction of public policy. But time and again in our roundtables, participants emphasized that building greater inclusivity into global governance will require a shift in both practice and mindset. The scale, complexity and urgency of global challenges require the widest possible set of contributors to solutions. National and international public officials are struggling to juggle a growing list of global challenges. Financial resources are stretched, and official development assistance is far from sufficient to carry the burden of large-scale global initiatives. International organizations' budgets are under almost constant strain. There are both pragmatic and legitimacy gains to be had for governments and international organizations that can think and act more inclusively.

What is already under way? What is needed?

A step change has already occurred in consultative processes by multilateral institutions/mechanisms and by national governments in terms of their global efforts. Structural policy engagement with multilateral bodies has been ongoing for years. Consider, for example, the number of side-events and consultation bodies now built into most multilateral summits, UN processes and high-profile international events. A key strand of the UN's 75th anniversary events in

2020 was the secretary-general's outreach initiative to crowd-source global perspectives on future priorities.⁵

Climate governance is known to be rich with inclusivity initiatives, born from the first formal effort at the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference. As of 2018, over 2,200 NGOs and 130 intergovernmental organizations have been admitted as observers.⁶

Our Inclusive Governance Initiative consultations in 2020 highlighted the proliferation of mechanisms for multi-stakeholder collaboration in global digital governance. The use of special envoys, working groups, formal observer platforms and outreach tours is now frequent practice for international organizations and national governments. For at least a decade, G20 and G7/G8 summits have included formal side-events for stakeholders; moreover, activity around the summits now involves a full year of outreach through structured engagement groups.

In our roundtables and supplementary conversations, it was frequently flagged that platforms for dialogue are not the same as mechanisms for upstream involvement in policy deliberation or decision-making. There are numerous pathways that enable would-be stakeholders to 'have a seat at the table'. But this is distinctly different from policy collaboration.

The challenge is to tease out the next level of specificity. Which issues work most effectively with a more collaborative approach? Aiming for concrete outcomes, what is the right balance of participation and mandates, broad representation and targeted expertise? How does one address questions around legitimacy and accountability in processes and mechanisms that involve non-state actors? And as more perspectives are included, how can these be marshalled towards effective outcomes rather than drawn-out and inconclusive processes?

These practical questions become even more complex when consideration moves from platforms for dialogue to carving out new roles for non-traditional actors in policy formulation. There are also significant challenges in pushing for broader participation during a period of increasing geopolitical competition. Many states are highly sensitive about the inclusion of non-state actors in governance arrangements, as well as about redistributions of influence between states themselves.

The global governance practitioners and experts consulted for the Inclusive Governance Initiative shared their perspectives on the development of pragmatic pathways for building greater effectiveness and legitimacy through inclusion, while recognizing the distinct roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. The following chapter outlines 10 insights from these discussions, with the aim of helping inform efforts towards inclusivity in global governance frameworks.

⁵ The consultation initiative culminated in the UN75 Final Report, *Shaping our Future*. Through the project, the UN actively consulted more than 1.5 million people from all 193 UN member and observer states, including hundreds of thousands through UN 75 dialogues and many more indirectly through collaborative partnerships. See United Nations (2021), *Shaping Our Future Together: Listening to People's Priorities for the Future and Their Ideas for Action*, Concluding Report of the UN75 Office, January 2021, New York: United Nations, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un75_final_report_shapingourfuturetogether.pdf.

⁶ The UNFCCC describes this broad spectrum of NGOs as including representatives from business and industry, environmental groups, farming and agriculture, indigenous populations, local governments and municipal authorities, research and academic institutes, labour unions, women and youth groups.

03

Ten insights: reflections on building more inclusive global governance

1. Agency has become more dispersed, but the power for transformational change at a global level still predominantly lies in the hands of states.

- **States remain the anchor of the international system.** Influential and innovative actors from across society can be impactful, but the legal mandate and responsibility for combating transnational challenges remain with governments. In many cases, governments also carry the public legitimacy that non-state actors do not.
- **International organizations are built on member state charters and can only push systemized global governance as far as states are willing to go.** On some issues, states are emphatically protective of their autonomy. A clear example is the governance of international investment, where it has proven impossible to build a multilateral approach, and where the regime is dominated by bilateral investment treaties.
- **Global coalition-building is still largely driven by traditional state-to-state diplomacy.** It is within these state-controlled channels that the necessary convening power, leverage of policy instruments and confidential cover for

parties to compromise reside. Moreover, the day-to-day work of multilateral diplomacy is still dominated by the familiar power-broker states. This is not only due to their geopolitical weight, but also because at a practical level they have the diplomatic staff and bandwidth for labour-intensive multilateral processes. If addressing imbalances is a priority, then under-resourced states must be empowered.

- **States still control the dominant tools for designing and enforcing international agreements**, including regulatory power, judicial authorities, economic incentives and penalties, and a range of other policy instruments.
- **If governance solutions to global issues are to be scalable and durable, then commitment from states is essential.** Veterans of landmark grassroots and civil society campaigns to protect the environment (such as the UN's High Seas Treaty⁷ negotiations) emphasize that multi-pronged campaigns for meaningful policy change must work inside the system as much as outside it.

2. Multilateral institutions provide a unique platform for developing nations, advocates/champions of particular issues and non-state actors to have a voice.

- **With their inclusive membership and cross-border mandates, multilateral institutions are uniquely positioned to convene the 'haves' and 'have nots'.** As one roundtable participant noted: 'A key strength of the United Nations is its ability to marry power and representation.' The balance is delicate, but such capability provides international organizations with unmatched legitimacy for global stakeholder outreach.
- Even though multilateral structures rarely offer a level playing field, **they have mechanisms for marginalized states to insert their views.** A striking example is the Alliance of Small Island States, which successfully cultivated an outsized voice for its members in the UNFCCC climate negotiations, especially leading up to and during the 2015 Paris talks. Not only was this group crucial in setting an ambitious temperature target (i.e. pursuing efforts to limit the increase in global temperature to 1.5°C by the end of the century compared to pre-industrial levels), but its members also created meaningful diplomatic leverage around their own future vulnerability, and fought for the recognition of loss and damage to be embedded in the Paris Agreement.
- **Global organizations can offer a venue that allows the exploration of states' contrasting priorities.** Understanding the varied threat landscape is critical to thinking through globally reaching norms and policy problems. In cybersecurity, it is noticeable in UN discussions on norms in cyberspace that advanced economies focus on hard security threats, whereas countries from the Global South often prioritize cybercrime. These conversations are playing out in two parallel UN working groups. The first is the UN's Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour

⁷ UN Treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction.

in Cyberspace,⁸ which has focused on the international security and military threat angle since its creation. The second, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG),⁹ has emerged as an arena for countries from the Global South to voice their priorities. This set-up was not originally envisioned; in fact, Russia launched the OEWG with a geostrategic agenda. But thanks to the fact that participation is open to any UN member state, the OEWG has enabled more than 100 nations to join the debate on global cybersecurity norms.

- **Ensuring substantive opportunities for middle and smaller powers and issue ‘champions’ to have a role in driving global policy is both just and smart.** Mid-sized and smaller states are increasingly driving issue-based coalitions on global governance and delivering results. Examples include the coalition on single-use plastics, where countries such as Norway, Vietnam and Indonesia played key roles in achieving the Basel Plastics Ban.¹⁰ Norway utilized the meeting of the existing Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste Disposal to partner with Southeast Asian countries recently hit by high levels of plastic waste imports,¹¹ and successfully converted the shift in public opinion on the issue into binding global action on plastic waste.

Inclusivity is not just about bringing in non-state actors, but also about ensuring diverse state engagement in governance deliberations.

- **Built-in power imbalances still dominate global governance bodies,** cementing widespread frustration that systemic global solutions are fundamentally inequitable. **Efforts to reshape multilateralism through greater inclusion will not work unless they address this deep distrust, especially among stakeholders from the Global South.** Inclusivity is not just about bringing in non-state actors, but also about ensuring diverse state engagement in governance deliberations.
- **More inclusive international platforms are especially important for ‘frontier’ policy issues.** For example, technology governance debates are still largely dominated by digital heavyweights, and thus ignore the interests of large swathes of the developing world. Representatives from Africa fairly point out

⁸ The UN GGE’s full title is ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security’. Its members are as follows: Australia, Brazil, China, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK, the US and Uruguay.

⁹ The OEWG’s full title is ‘Open-ended working group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security’.

¹⁰ The instrument commonly known as the Basel Plastics Ban is the 2019 amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal. The amendment significantly expanded the convention’s trade bans on plastic waste.

¹¹ In January 2018, China announced a ban on the import of plastic waste, causing the waste crisis to shift towards coastal countries in Southeast Asia. Almost overnight, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam became world leaders in plastic-waste disposal, and prime potential partners for multilateral collaboration. In the first six months of 2018 alone, plastic-waste imports in Thailand increased by over 1,300 per cent.

that current debates do not take into account the coming demographic explosion on the continent, with millions of internet users likely to be excluded from the digital governance decisions under which they will live.

3. Governments and international organizations recognize the growing strength of non-state actors, but inclusion means more than just creating a ‘larger tent’.

- **A shift towards multi-stakeholder initiatives is under way, but questions about structure and process abound.** Stakeholder engagement processes are now prolific in national and multinational governance, but plenty of core questions remain about who to include and when, where to fold inclusion into policy processes, and how to organize these efforts with a balance of flexibility and fairness.
- **Stakeholder and transparency initiatives gain credibility by engaging early and often.** Extensive consultation not only improves the transparency of decision-making, but also offers governments a potential means of tapping into initiatives under way with the private sector, NGOs or other civic actors. In an era of strained public budgets and pressing demands on state capacity, both competition and collaboration can be helpful.
- **Multi-stakeholder processes tend to cluster constituencies into large baskets,** even though the three-way ‘private sector, civil society, government’ format is far too simplistic. Multinational corporations, the financial sector, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and business start-ups have widely varied interests and assets to contribute. In the technology sector, for example, Microsoft has uniquely set up a UN affairs office in New York. CSOs and grassroots movements are also far from monolithic. Scientific and technical experts often get lumped into the same broad ‘civil society’ category. Ensuring a balanced mix of voices is always tricky, but it is essential to successful multi-stakeholder work. One frequent frustration voiced by roundtable participants was over who decides the composition of governance bodies and coalitions, and how these decisions are made.
- **The larger the ‘tent’, the slimmer the possibility of achieving operational outcomes.** Inclusivity initiatives often run into the inherent challenge of ensuring a broad-based platform is useful in policy terms. How large can you make the group of participants while keeping the process manageable and effective? The UN’s Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is known to face this challenge. The IGF annually convenes a meeting of thousands of digital policy stakeholders for broad-based discussion of digital issues. Interested parties can actively direct the discussions. But even though the IGF’s mandate is as a dialogue platform, not a decision-making body, it is frequently criticized for being talk-heavy and ‘outcome-lite’. Amid concerns around participant retention and the translation of proposals into actual policy, numerous ideas for reforming the IGF are circulating.

- **Some hybrid models are emerging that aim to find the right size and structural balance to encourage non-governmental outreach in governmental policy.** One example is the Freedom Online Coalition, a group of 32 governments working together to defend internet freedom. The coalition's structure consists of a top layer of government representatives, below which smaller working groups provide a platform to bring in targeted stakeholders. The blend of multilateral and multi-stakeholder formats seems to be working well.
- **Converting fluid, multi-stakeholder groups into institutional structures is a challenge.** The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the multi-stakeholder body responsible for defining the technical policies for running the internet, offers a case in point. In the course of its evolution over the past two decades, ICANN has carefully sought to navigate between input and authority through its complicated composition and decision-making procedures built on consensus. This has been a bumpy road (see Box 1). Some lessons indicate that bottom-up processes work best when structured with a clearly defined purpose and mandate, an empowered referee, built-in accountability mechanisms, and key power-brokers committed to the process and willing to implement its decisions.

Box 1. The multi-stakeholder model of ICANN

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the body responsible for coordinating the internet naming system worldwide. It was designed from the outset as a multi-stakeholder organization that would function through consensus-driven policymaking. Converting its fluid, bottom-up approach into a formal structure was not without controversy.

ICANN developed complex voting procedures and intricate governance mechanisms to try to ensure a representative balance of power among stakeholders and competing interests. It developed an ambitious, multi-layered governing structure involving a board of mixed stakeholders coupled with diverse community councils, committees and supporting organizations.

The evolution of ICANN's organizational structure has presented numerous challenges, and representation is still contentious. Given the commitment to the principle of consensus, the ICANN community determines policy recommendations and the corporation's board approves them. (It would be rare for the board to veto a community proposal.) But it is questionable whether this structure produces efficient decision-making. The organization continues to debate its multi-stakeholder model and how to evolve.

- **Stakeholder engagement is difficult on issues where the confidentiality bar is high.** For example, there has been a growing push for greater civil society engagement on investment governance policies. But when it comes to issues such as national security screening, governments can be highly sensitive about sharing information even with each other, let alone with civil society. Similarly, on the question of widening channels for civic representation in investor–state dispute settlement, there is a tricky balance between the public aspect of a dispute case and the confidential legal process and deal-making.
- **Creating formal structures for outside stakeholders in multilateral organizations is challenging.** Wide outreach and ‘listening sessions’ can only achieve so much. Ensuring in-house representation or deeper policy involvement is more controversial. Some states remain highly sensitive about empowering civil society and youth constituencies, in particular. Ad hoc structures may not be the most efficient solution, but in some cases they are the most achievable option.
- **With ad hoc initiatives or voluntary pledges, implementation and enforcement are a struggle.** Pledges, norms and practices agreed by multi-stakeholder groups often lack means of implementation or enforcement, adding to their fragility. For the voluntary 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, this problem was tackled by launching a group of interested parties called the Paris Call Community, in which each member committed to take the lead in developing follow-on work streams for one of the nine pledged principles.¹²

4. Multilateral organizations may face a trust deficit, but so do multi-stakeholder initiatives.

- **Inclusive governance is not about how to have everyone at the table. It is about having the *right* mix.** Dissatisfaction with many previous or existing multi-stakeholder initiatives has generally come back to the issue of who precisely is included – and, just as important, who makes decisions and how decisions are reached. The differing mandates of public officials and private citizens (including private sector and civic groups) are central to this problem. Inclusive processes require time and patience to increase trust between the constituencies needed to deliver results.
- **Stakeholders recognize when engagement is superficial.** A role for stakeholders in a *deliberative* process is very different from one in a *decision-making* process. Multi-stakeholder formats can engender trust by being transparent about their purpose and mandate from the outset. The proliferation of engagement platforms has also forced many stakeholders, including governments, to be selective in terms of where they spend their time and resources.

¹² For example, Microsoft, the (non-governmental) Alliance for Securing Democracy and the government of Canada have taken the lead in mobilizing action on Principle Number 3 of the Paris Call, which is a commitment for signatories to ‘strengthen our capacity to prevent malign interference by foreign actors aimed at undermining electoral processes through malicious cyber activities’.

- **Outcomes depend on a clear purpose. A lack of outcomes affects stakeholder participation.** When value wanes, key players stop attending and the entire formula loses legitimacy. A multi-stakeholder process without key government or private sector participation, for example, can end up just becoming a forum in which civil society talks to itself.
- **Multi-stakeholder processes are susceptible to challenges associated with elitism, power imbalances and the influence of money.** Consistent, meaningful multi-stakeholder collaboration requires significant resources. In practical terms, this limits participation to a small group of heavyweight actors – often a familiar list of states, large corporations with dedicated public policy staff, and well-funded CSOs. Whether public or private, most other stakeholders do not have the staff and time necessary to keep up with labour-intensive governance processes. Even the governments of many developing countries are stretched in terms of possessing the human and financial resources – and often the required portfolio literacy – to participate actively and regularly.

Without explicit efforts to bring participants from the Global South, or other under-represented and under-resourced voices, into global governance discussions, inclusive policies can still miss the mark by a wide margin.

- **The speed and agility of non-governmental stakeholders can be assets,** and can even complement governments in some areas where bureaucratic obstacles need to be overcome. Digital governance was raised as an example, considering the speed of technological change. As one government official commented: **‘There will be actors who want to go further and faster than governments can. That’s OK. Give them a venue.’** In an era of budget pressure and heavily burdened government agendas, outside partnerships can be practical.
- **Inclusivity projects gain credibility by engaging early and often, throughout the policy life cycle.** Extensive consultation improves the transparency of decision-making, facilitates implementation partnerships, and develops collaboration with interested parties who can help to bring global policies closer to local communities. Upstream collaboration in policy formation can offer government officials practical insight along the way, which is especially useful with rapidly evolving issues such as technology or with issues on a pressing implementation track, such as climate change mitigation.
- **Multi-stakeholder initiatives can widen global fissures and inequities.** Globally diverse representation does not emerge automatically just because a process is open. Without explicit efforts to bring participants from the Global South, or other under-represented and under-resourced voices, into global governance discussions, inclusive policies can still miss the mark by a wide margin.

5. Transparency should be a priority when rebooting global governance. It is not just a principle. Data, open access and citizen action can create new opportunities.

- **Bottom-up reporting and transparency initiatives can open up space for policy action.** In the areas of air and water quality, for example, citizen reporting initiatives such as the ‘Blue Map App’ database (see Box 2) have helped to create new leverage with governments and private sector actors in countries seeking to downplay the problem, such as China. Given that problems like air pollution do not stop at borders, broader national pick-up of pollution control is valuable for combating this global challenge. Global momentum could perhaps, even if only indirectly, increase diplomatic ‘space’ for the development of global standards.

Box 2. Data as a tool – air quality reporting

Information disclosure and public participation have become valuable resources for environmental governance. The work of the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), a research organization based in China, offers one example of noteworthy air quality gains and carbon emissions cuts being born from an initiative specifically built to encourage information transparency and reductions in environmental impact.

By strengthening monitoring of pollution sources, IPE has increased pressure on emitters in China, encouraged their environmental compliance and stimulated public participation in environmental governance. The organization, committed to ‘leveraging the power of information to advance environmental transformation, promoting disclosure and improving environmental governance mechanisms’,¹³ has built an extensive database on air and water pollution sources across China.

Collated from government and corporate disclosures along with direct citizen contributions through a real-time app (‘Blue Map App’), IPE’s database launched in 2009 with 2,000 records and now includes nearly 2 million reports from stakeholders across society and sectors. IPE is actively following tens of thousands of key enterprises in China, and has prompted more than 2,000 companies to publicly explain their violations of environmental standards. IPE asserts that this has led to direct gains in environmental performance.

Third-party tracking and public reporting initiatives not only promote transparency, but can serve as a resource for monitoring compliance, promoting accountability and inducing behaviour change. In this way citizens can become contributors to governance, and data can become a metric both for those governing and for other concerned global actors (such as the private sector). Although crowdsourced data must be treated with care, credible third-party reporting and transparency initiatives can contribute to the global governance toolbox.

¹³ Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (2019), ‘Vision and mission: Bring back clear water and blue skies, Protect the Earth’, <http://www.ipe.org.cn/about/about.html> (accessed 23 Mar. 2021).

- **Data transparency can act as a lever on the ESG decisions of business and financial organizations, thereby affecting global governance.**
In recent years, civic voices have helped to shift the calculations of multinational corporations on environmental and social issues. This has been achieved largely through impact on public opinion, as well as through market power and pressure from employees. Data is also a resource for companies and investors looking to take action. Asset managers and financial managers, for example, rely heavily on metric-based analysis.
- **Evidence-based approaches cannot ensure breakthroughs in global diplomacy, but they can help parties to work from a common page.** Credible data collection and tracking can help to build common awareness of issues from varied perspectives. For example, in the economic arena, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has a dedicated initiative to track investment agreements worldwide. UNCITRAL's central database of agreements has created a resource for those working on cross-border investment governance policy to track trends in both developed and developing economies. The OECD does similar work on a number of issues with global reach. Data reporting is a valuable task for international organizations, given their credibility.
- **Recognizing civil society's distinct vantage point can help to build trust between governments and NGOs.** For example, it is often NGOs and the organizers of other transparency initiatives that provide data to governments on illegal fishing in the ungoverned high seas. Civil society's 'eyes and ears' are helpful, given the difficulty of monitoring this expansive area of the global commons.
- **Civil society and non-governmental actors, especially those with on-the-ground projects or local mandates, can be a repository of intelligence useful to policy drafters and negotiators.** On issues that will require significant social change, such as the implementation of global agreements to decrease carbon emissions, the connection of NGOs to the daily realities of populations – and the intelligence this provides – can be useful to policymakers working on global governance.
- **Grassroots organizations are developing more sophisticated, multi-pronged approaches to their global issue campaigns.** Coordination, cross-disciplinary exchange and technology tools are providing new means to mobilize public opinion, and are also supporting the development of cross-border networks and new 'insertion points' for policy advocacy and partnership. The environmental policy community is particularly active in this area. The movement to effect change on single-use plastics evolved into a coalition of over 1,400 NGOs; its multi-track strategy produced changes in international, regional, national, local and corporate policy.¹⁴

¹⁴ Some of the coalition's gains included: at international level – the Basel Convention Amendment of 2019; at regional level – the circular economy dialogue in the EU; at national level – legislation passed in Bangladesh, Greece and India, among others; at local level – legislation on the use of plastics in a number of cities; and at corporate level – the Davos commitment by 11 companies.

Box 3. Civil society and diversity

As with other constituencies, civil society cannot be treated as a monolithic voice when it comes to inclusivity platforms. This is not only a matter of the *thematic* diversity of civil society organizations (CSOs). Differentiated treatment is also required because of the diverse advantages or disadvantages that each organization brings in terms of its size, structure, reliability of funding and technical knowledge. The civil society ecosystem varies greatly from one culture or political context to another.

Consider, for example, the nuances of any policy debate that potentially includes perspectives from large, established international CSOs, local community associations, private foundations, faith-based organizations, advocacy NGOs, grassroots movements, and unstructured groups of interested individuals.

The diversity of social groups representing women, children and young people also needs to be taken into account. So, too, do the varying agendas and expertise of professional groups, trade unions, specialists in academia, the legal profession and the scientific community.

Philanthropic organizations and NGOs also now often band together to form standing coalitions, especially on wide-reaching global issues.

- **Engaging more diverse civil society actors would be useful for consideration of global issues.** Civil society is far from homogeneous (see Box 3). For example, the roles of advocacy, awareness, research, capacity-building and development groups all vary. These actors have very distinct mandates and represent different constituencies. A better understanding of civil society actors in countries in the Global South would help address diversity gaps. In some cases, it can be easier for civil society to access regional organizations such as the African Union or European Union.
- **International organizations are well on the way towards opening their doors more fully to civil society through observer participation in major meetings.** Unfortunately, there remains frustration over vague mandates, inconsistencies in representation, and even attempts by governments to engineer the composition of delegations to fit their policy agendas. In practical terms, securing formal ‘observer status’ is a laborious bureaucratic process, and challenging for groups that do not regularly work inside this system. Resource constraints, and the location of most multilateral organizations in the Global North, have created an asymmetry in civil society representation. Participation is often pared down to larger CSOs or well-funded groups. Multilateral bodies are generally committed in principle to engagement, but there is room for improvement.

6. Plurilateral, regional and ‘minilateral’ governance solutions have become popular alternatives to multilateral gridlock.

- **Starting with minilateral agreements or small-group voluntary commitments can provide a pathway to achieving global norms.** The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed by 23 countries in 1947, is an oft-cited example. In general, the governance of cross-border trade and investment has continued to be oriented in a similar direction. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), paired with regional or plurilateral agreements, anchor the governance regime. Given challenges around international economic competition and the complexity of today’s geopolitics, a multilateral investment governance initiative seems unlikely in the near term.
- **Minilateral agreements have helped blocs of like-minded parties to bolster their diplomatic leverage within complex global governance negotiations.** For example, informal ‘climate clubs’ have emerged in the UNFCCC negotiations. At times, such coalitions have stepped in when negotiations have faced multilateral deadlock.
- **Regional governance alternatives are on the rise.** In the economic arena, the move towards a new generation of trade and investment agreements is occurring mostly in regional or national tracks; experts expect this trend to continue. In cyber governance, although the UN has not been able to move past the broad norms agreed by the UN GGE in 2015, an interesting development has been their pick-up by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The OAS and ASEAN were willing to go even further than the GGE in terms of pledges, although experts argue that prospects for effective implementation remain uncertain, largely due to capacity gaps at both organizations.
- **Non-binding pledges can still be helpful in advancing the global expansion of norms.** States already use such pledges as an alternative when negotiations stall. But even non-institutional initiatives can be helpful for global governance by broadening support for core principles. The voluntary Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace exemplifies this approach. The Paris Call is based on nine common principles to secure cyberspace, which draw and elaborate on the 11 norms agreed by the member states of the UN GGE in 2015. As a result, there are now over 1,000 signatories to the nine principles set out by the Paris Call, including states, technology companies and NGOs. There is also a hope among some actors that this mechanism can establish a new *de facto* baseline for state behaviour, thereby indirectly creating opportunities for cyber governance negotiations on the multilateral track.
- **Action at alternative tiers of governance can provide opportunities to advance global standards when international processes are stuck.** Working to advance norms at sub-global levels – regional, national or local – can help to combat stagnation or policy rollback in the multilateral domain. For example, advocates of a stronger global anti-corruption regime have been making little progress in the multilateral track. So they have pivoted to a multi-level approach, finding more traction in pushing for transparency and anti-corruption

standards in regional trade and investment agreements and bilateral treaties. Advocates are also pressing for change at the local level, utilizing procurement rules to push for implementation of existing international standards along with greater ambition in developing the global framework. These tracks cannot substitute for multilateral action, but they can be interpreted as a win for global governance by expanding the reach of anti-corruption principles.

- **In international investment governance, regional bodies may have greater room to manoeuvre in reforming standards** for investment agreements or mechanisms for dispute resolution. Current debates around weaknesses in the investor–state dispute settlement regime, and calls for reform, are more or less the same as they were 15 years ago. Perhaps a new global system of standards is unattainable, and more plurilateral or regional options should be considered, as appears to be taking place in the Asia-Pacific.

7. Subnational arrangements can be a resource to bring global governance closer to the people, and an asset in the implementation of global agreements.

- **Climate policy highlights some of the unique impacts** that subnational bodies can bring to modern global governance.
- **Implementation is an area in which cities and other subnational governments can stand out.** Their specific, localized governance mandates offer a unique combination of policy levers and legitimacy to drive results, although this is dependent on resources and the degree of autonomy that each body enjoys within its national political context. While regulatory authority is variable, local governments often lead in areas such as transport, urban planning and development, health and other social services. This provides them with both an obligation and the opportunity to create green policies.

For a meaningful voice at the global policy table, local governments must demonstrate that they are solution providers rather than just steps in the implementation chain.

- Given their smaller scale, **subnational bodies have the ability to move more quickly.** They are often more agile and have greater freedom to innovate. In many cases, such organizations are held to tighter timelines in terms of delivering results, and face more direct policy accountability. Their smaller size also makes it easier to build a comprehensive approach to climate change or environmental pollution, an important element for success when dealing with policy issues that cut across society and the economy.

- **Local leaders are finding collective power on the global stage.** Banding together in coalitions such as the C40 Cities Network – where authorities from 97 of the world’s 100 largest cities work together on climate change – has amplified the voice of participants.¹⁵ One positive by-product of this approach is the creation of a network of local and subnational officials who can be tapped for governance coordination or the exchange of ideas on other pressing global challenges. For instance, the C40 has turned out to be a useful resource for mayors around the world during the COVID-19 pandemic. Almost immediately after the start of the crisis, the network was used for informal information exchange; its members have now built a formal knowledge hub to exchange information on COVID-19 management, and are working together on ideas for a green and just economic recovery.
- **Whether subnational governance has a measurable impact on the global policy process remains debatable, however.** Former government officials have emphasized the well-recognized problem of measuring results and disentangling the levers of national and subnational influence.
- **For a meaningful voice at the global policy table, local governments must demonstrate that they are solution providers** rather than just steps in the implementation chain.
- **Creating insertion points into policy processes for local officials directly at the global level, without undermining national governments, is complicated.** In particular, there are sensitivities for multilateral institutions reliant on states for support, participation and financing.
- Pragmatic approaches could work best. For example, **multinational policymakers could benefit from much earlier consideration of the bottom-up information** and implementation insights that city leaders can provide.
- **Multilateral institutions could benefit from the legitimacy dividend of greater collaboration with subnational and local governments.** As with civil society networks, the proximity of local government leaders to their constituents could be turned into an opportunity to connect global governance more closely to daily life.
- **Funding subnational governments is the next battleground.** Local and other subnational authorities do not normally qualify for assistance from international financial institutions, which are designed for cooperation with national governments. Local and other subnational governments cannot carry debt in the same way that nations do, and often lack the metrics to qualify for private financing. Budget pressures are likely to be even tighter in the next couple of years, as local bodies seek to manage the post-COVID-19 economic recovery while dealing with the consequences of depleted coffers.

¹⁵ The C40 is just one of many new networks of subnational, city and local governments around the world. These networks are growing rapidly.

- **Progress can also be made on funding.** Over the past year, there has been a fundamental rethink of the way in which financing should be structured for subnational governments to advance climate action. Finding new pathways to raise revenue is the top priority. Innovative approaches are emerging, ranging from underexplored private sector financing vehicles to impact bonds or a sub-state-level carbon tax. One creative option proposed: perhaps it is time for a multilateral municipal bank?

8. Youth inclusion needs to shift from listening mode to policy participation. Global challenges demand an intergenerational perspective.

- **Global challenges have a long time horizon and need durable policies.** The next generation has a vested interest in effective global policy decisions, given that it will be left to face the consequences of such decisions. This point has been made vividly by youth activists with regard to climate change.
- **Youth engagement is often frustrated by superficial listening from governance institutions and initiatives – platforms for active policy contribution are required.** With half the world's population under the age of 30, and youth activism becoming ever more powerful, governments, international bodies and businesses recognize young people as key constituencies. But outreach should not be confined to giving youth activists a stage at a few high-profile events. **The next generation needs to be fundamentally embedded in the crafting of global governance commitments.** Platforms need to be developed that allow young people to engage concretely with policymakers, not just operate in the sphere of public opinion. The UN hosted a Youth Climate Summit in 2019, in which the roles of participants were explicitly reorganized so that officials were in the listening seat and globally diverse youth voices had the lead.
- **The next generations have unique viewpoints and assets to contribute.** Today's young people have grown up in a globally connected world. They are more inclined towards networked approaches, and are often more connected with cutting-edge developments at the grassroots level. As with civil society movements generally, grassroots youth networks can act as valuable implementation partners and liaisons in linking global governance policies with important constituencies.
- **Recognizing young people as partners for change would go a long way to establishing trust.** Bringing youth councils or youth advisers directly into formal policy processes (international or national) could help to build confidence in the seriousness of outreach and engagement efforts. The Danish government is testing a new formula, with a Youth Advisory Council feeding directly into the Ministry of Climate's daily policy work.
- **There is a wide experience and capacity gap to fill** in order to bring young people into institutional processes. The majority of youth organizations lack institutional experience, let alone the know-how needed to navigate the world

of governments, international organizations and policy process. Including young voices from developing countries needs dedicated attention, especially given additional challenges such as the digital divide, language barriers and financial constraints. Scholarships and training programmes, or even short-term postings inside international organizations, would help.

- **There are a surprising number of structural, organizational and legal hurdles to young people entering politics or government in many countries.** In a significant number of countries, people under the age of 30 are either ineligible to run for office or face other structural obstacles. This makes it even harder to engage young people on an equal basis in discussions on the future of global governance.
- **International organizations have an additional nuance to manage,** as some states are especially uncomfortable with empowering young actors because of domestic sensitivities with regard to youth protests in recent years. In such cases, issue-based participation may be more useful than systemic integration into international institutions.

9. Capacity-building is an effective means to cultivate more inclusive global governance.

- **Power and resources still largely define who sets the global rules in any given domain.** This is the case not only with states, but also civil society and the private sector where heavyweight actors or those well-resourced can access and impact global governance conversations. Upskilling and empowering partners offers a practical pathway to promoting inclusivity and creating a deeper pool of solution-providers.
- **Few developing countries have the government capacity to take on global leadership campaigns,** either on the multilateral or multi-stakeholder track. Assisting with expertise and capacity so that developing-country governments can work these channels more effectively would help to diversify, and thereby strengthen, global governance. This work is not new, but its importance bears repeating if the goal is more inclusive global representation.
- **Regional organizations are increasingly active in setting cross-border norms and standards.** Some, such as the EU, are not only driving digital and environmental norms in their regions, but also actively building capacity abroad. **Others still lack the technical expertise needed to convert statements of principles into action.** For example, strong pledges by ASEAN and the OAS on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, picking up where the UN was blocked, may be difficult to implement for capacity reasons.
- **Targeted technical assistance from national governments can be used to advance norm adoption among like-minded states or actors.** For example, Norway worked closely with states from Southeast Asia to pass an Amendment to the Basel Convention banning plastic waste. Norway is now investing

significant funding in projects with ASEAN and throughout the region to bolster local capacity to fight plastic pollution. Another illustration is Australia's capacity-building activities with states in the Asia-Pacific on cyber norms.

- **Capacity-building can offer a partial workaround in areas where geopolitical competition has deadlocked multilateral progress.** In the area of internet and cyber governance, where competing blocs are entrenched in their different views, capacity-building is being used to build momentum towards shared normative positions and policies, even if global agreement on codified principles is beyond reach. Dedicated multi-stakeholder platforms such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) – a coordinating initiative of over 50 countries along with intergovernmental organizations and private companies – are taking the strategy further by building specialized tools to share information about and between capacity-building programmes to avoid duplication, share learnings and identify global gaps.
- **To empower the actors needed for global governance to succeed, it is time for more creative financing goals.** Official bilateral development assistance is not enough. Interesting innovations are under way, especially in the environmental arena. The time is ripe for intensified efforts on financing, whether through unlocking new programmes via international financial institutions, incentivizing corporates or adapting private sector financing vehicles. For example, private sector financing vehicles are proving their value in empowering actors to advance climate change mitigation and adaptation. But so far, the ESG and socially responsible investing movements remain largely independent of activity on the SDGs. Although outreach initiatives such as the UN's Global Compact link the corporate community with the SDG agenda, capital flows are still yet to be harnessed effectively for SDG purposes – or, for that matter, for most other global governance tracks.

10. Rapidly evolving global issues will require a fluid mix of governance solutions. It is the only way to keep pace with the complex challenges of today's world. But existing global rules and law still have a role.

- The ecosystem of global governance is rapidly expanding, and creating an ever more fragmented global architecture of norms, standards and rules for cross-border practice. This diffuse formula carries risk, but its **fluidity can also offer space for developing solutions to address critical governance gaps or adapt to emerging needs.**
- **Rigid, institutionalized governance structures will retain some areas of unique competency and value. In other areas, soft-law norms, rules and processes can fill a gap.** International organizations, and multilateralism more generally, may be suffering from a crisis of confidence. But there are still areas of international interaction that will require binding, institutionalized rules; these areas include economic competition, certain international security issues and aspects of the global commons.

- **Balancing the agility and opportunity of voluntary commitments with the advantages of durable, binding commitments is a challenge** for today's global governance regimes. Perhaps more concerning, the rapid proliferation of governance frameworks carries a risk of confusion, duplication and fragmentation. That said, does opening up global governance to more actors necessarily lead to fragmentation? And does fragmentation necessarily undermine more embedded, formalized commitments between governments?
- **'Norm entrepreneurs' are prolific in the arena of digital governance.** One participant noted that 23 major institutional regimes interact with each other in the cyber governance ecosystem; another that there are more than 1,000 processes under way on diverse internet governance and digital policy issues. Yet this fragmented approach also risks confusion and contradiction.
- **Balancing speed and diligence is essential.** Intergovernmental processes are notoriously sluggish and difficult to advance. Non-governmental actors have more flexibility, although moving fast is not a necessity. During our roundtables, grassroots campaign veterans noted the fragility of public attention and political leverage; at the same time, private sector participants noted that their accountability to customers requires rapid results. But speed does not produce the durability of codified agreements and government commitment.
- **Legitimacy questions remain a common thread.** Do non-state initiatives, even in formalized commitments, hold legitimacy in global governance if they are not anchored by states or converted into international agreements? If non-governmental or multi-stakeholder initiatives succeed in advancing global rules in the interim, under whose authority and with what mandate do they hold sway? Does legitimacy derive from the actors involved or the process?
- **The proliferation of fluid, global norms does not necessarily have to compete with the existing system of rules, so long as new norms do not undermine that system.** In areas where agreed global standards do exist – such as international human rights law – it is important that existing rules are not undermined through the pursuit of more temporal, non-binding solutions.

04

The way ahead

Our roundtable discussions emphasized that rebalancing global governance to reflect the needs of today's world requires the meaningful inclusion of a much wider range of stakeholders. The constituencies with a vested interest in global governance reach far beyond the current narrow group with the standing ability and mandate to participate. Agents of change are more dispersed and empowered than ever before, and traditional governance processes can no longer function without them.

At the same time, geopolitical and geo-economic competition is on the rise. Given this increasing polarization, consensus between states is elusive and many multilateral processes are gridlocked. This is a significant obstacle to progress on inclusivity as key actors revert to 'statist' positions, uncomfortable with efforts to distribute representation more equitably or to bring in a more diverse array of non-state and sub-state actors.

Analysing how existing and past efforts on inclusivity have yielded dividends for states will be key to overcoming the above challenges. So, too, will a realistic assessment of where movement is more likely, given political sensitivities and inherent differences in opportunity for meaningful action outside state-controlled processes. More needs to be done to address key questions (both pragmatic and of principle) around the requirements for legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. Newly emerging and fast-moving global policy areas, where governance is in its infancy, perhaps offer particularly rich opportunity for exploration.

Annex: Roundtable themes and participants

Roundtable sessions

As part of the Inclusive Governance Initiative, Chatham House organized roundtables between February and July 2020 on the following subjects:

- ‘Innovating Global Governance: Examples from the Digital Arena’
- ‘Environmental Governance: How Innovative Approaches Advanced Gains in Air Quality and Oceans’
- ‘Insights from Climate Governance: Engaging Subnational Governments in Global Platforms’
- ‘Global Investment Governance: Implications of Greater Use of Investment Screening’
- ‘Global Investment Governance: The Future of the Investor–State Dispute Settlement Regime’
- ‘Global Investment Governance: Implications of Post-COVID-19 Supply Chain Restructuring’

Participants

Roundtable participants included diverse voices from countries around the world, including Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the UK and various US voices (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Iowa, New York and Washington, DC). International organizations added to the mix, including representation from the UN secretary-general’s office, varied UN agencies, the OECD, the EU, the World Bank and ad hoc international coalitions.



Reflections on building more inclusive global governance

Ten insights into emerging practice

Sector participation has likewise been wide-ranging, including national and local government, regional organizations, multilateral institutions and their agencies, academia, grassroots action groups, youth actors, CSOs and civil society coalitions, philanthropic bodies, regulatory authorities, corporate voices, commercial associations, legal experts and international dispute-resolution bodies.



About the Chatham House Inclusive Governance Initiative

In 2020, its centenary year, Chatham House launched the Inclusive Governance Initiative. The initiative investigates practical pathways for strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance through shaping mechanisms and institutions that are more inclusive. Led by the institute's director and the International Law Programme, the initiative draws on expertise from across the institute: the Asia-Pacific Programme; the Digital Society Initiative; the Energy, Environment and Resources Programme; the Global Economy and Finance Programme; the Hoffman Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy; and the International Security Programme.

This paper synthesizes insights from a series of roundtables held under the Chatham House Rule that brought together a distinct mix of traditional stakeholders and experts along with newer actors in the global governance space. We are grateful to participants in the roundtables and interviews for their engagement and valuable insights.

This paper was drafted by Laurie Dundon, project consultant. It benefited from the input of Ruma Mandal, director, International Law Programme; the institute's director, Dr Robin Niblett; and its deputy director, Dr Renata Dwan; as well as Chatham House research colleagues who participated in the roundtables. We are grateful to Jake Statham for his meticulous editing and to Chanu Peiris and Jacqueline Rowe in the International Law Programme for organizing the roundtables.

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The views expressed in this paper reflect those articulated by participants in the roundtables and supplementary interviews. They are not intended to reflect any consensus reached among participants. Nor should they be construed as reflecting any institutional position on the part of Chatham House.

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Cover image: Mayors and youth activists hold a joint press conference at the C40 World Mayors Summit on 11 October 2019 in Copenhagen, Denmark.

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